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Japan's rising economic prowess in the 1980's and its penetration
of the North American automobile marketplace produced a major
economic restructuring. Seven Asian automobile assembly plants,
along with four Japanese-Big Three joint ventures, and GM's Saturn
were built across the industrial heartland of the United States and
Canada. 1 This common experience, accompanied by a transformation
in industrial . production methods and the reorganization of work
defined in terms of Japanese lean production techniques and cooperative labor relations, created a crisis for the Fordist regime of
industrial production, its system of labor-management relations, and
organized labor. 2 Lean production has also created a crisis for the
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advice and encouragement of Ernest J. Yanarella and from site visits at the assembly plants of
Honda (Alliston, Ont.), Toyota (Cambridge, Ont. and Georgetown, Ky.), CAMI (Ingersoll,
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I. The term "Japanese transplants" will be used to describe the Japanese auto plants
in the United States and Canada which have never operated as joint ventures with an American
Big Three auto firm. They are the Honda plants in Marysville, Ohio, and Alliston, Ont.; the
Toyota plants in Georgetown, Ky. and Cambridge, Ont.; the Nissan plant in Smyrna, Tenn.;
and the Subaru-Isuzu plant in Lafayette, Ind. The wider term, "Asian transplants," will be
used to describe the Japanese transplants and Hyundai, the South Korean auto firm whose
North American plant is located in Bromont, Que.
Diamond-Star, originally a Chrysler-Mitsubishi joint venture became a wholly-owned Mitsubishi plant in October, 1991. See Chandler and Stertz, Mitsubishi Buys Chrysler's 50 Percent
Stake in Their Diamond-Star Joint Ventures, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1991, at 4. Mazda's Flat
Rock plant, was a nominally sole venture by the Japanese automaker. Ford, which owns 25
percent of Mazda was the silent partner. See Mike Parker, New Union Concessions in Secret
Agreement Between UA W. Mazda, LAB. NoTEs, Feb. 1986, at 13. In June, 1992, Mazda became
AutoAlliance International, a 50/50 Ford-Mazda joint venture. Ford also has a joint venture
with Nissan at Avon Lake, Ohio, ·which has recently begun to produce the Ford Villager/Nissan
Quest minivan.
2. Ernest J. Yanarella & William C. Green, The UA W and CAW Confront Lean
Production at Saturn, CAM/, and the Japanese Automobile Transplants, 18 LAB. ST. J. 52,
52-53 (1994).
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) paradigm. 3 The NLRA, the
legal foundation for United States and Canadian labor-management
relations, carves out a limited right for labor to organize, to negotiate
with management over wages, hours, and working conditions, and to
take concerted action, but which otherwise gives labor and management a considerable freedom to privately determine the substance of
their collectively bargained contracts. 4
In this article, I argue that the NLRA paradigm faces a dual
crisis. The paradigm's public law dimension, based on United States
and Canadian labor statutes, is threatened by Asian auto transplants
which have traded upon its narrow statutory confines to avoid unionization and to suppress union organizing efforts by using lean
production-based plant location criteria, worker recruitment and training methods, and team concept production practices. At the same
time, the paradigm's private law dimension, based on collectively
bargained agreements, is being altered by the Japanese-Big Three joint
ventures and Saturn which have used the NLRA's freedom of contract
to abandon the highly formalized and detailed contracts produced by
adversarial labor-management relations and to negotiate lean production high-trust cooperative labor agreements with the UAW and CAW.
In addition, the Saturn Labor Agreement has employed co-determination principles to extend labor participation beyond joint shop floor
governance to strategic decision making. 5 Yet, these agreements, along
with the Asian transplants' anti-union strategy, have been perceived
as management efforts to use lean production and co-determination
principles to extend and enhance managerial power at labor's expense.
As a consequence, the NLRA paradigm has become contested terrain.
Labor and management's arguments and actions have already begun
to redefine the paradigm's adversarial character and have established
the agenda for the current debate over United States labor law reform.
To explore this argument, Part I provides a cross-national framework to analyze the NLRA paradigm's dual crisis and the prospects
for United States labor law reform. Part II defines the NLRA paradigm and outlines the nature of the challenge it confronts from lean
production labor relations. Parts III and IV explore the consequences
of lean production's recruitment methods, cooperative labor-management programs, and team concept workplace practices for the NLRA
paradigm, first at the non-union Asian transplants and then at their
joint ventures with the Big Three automakers and at Saturn. Finally,
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Part V draws upon these experiences to assess the prospects for United
States labor law reform.
I.

THE STRUCTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

The North American automobile industry has become the setting
for a struggle over competing visions of labor-management relations
in a post-Fordist world. 6 A management vision, defined by Japanese
lean production, is most ably extolled by James Womack, Daniel
Jones and Daniel Roos, 7 and by Martin Kenney and Richard Florida. 8
A competing labor vision, more sensitive to the cruel reality of the
shop floor and the need for a more humane workplace, has been
expounded upon by Knuth Dohse, 9 Rianne Mahon, 10 Mike Parker
and Jane Slaughter, 11 Alain Lipietz, 12 and Barry and Irving Bluestone.13 Together these visions define the issues and interests involved
and reveal the tensions among contending labor systems built upon
Fordist adversarialism, Japanese cooperation, and German co-determination. However, both are faulted by their failure to appreciate
the political and legal foundations for labor-management relations
and the limitations these realities impose upon any vision for a new
industrial order.
One way to understand this struggle over competing visions,
assess their political and legal dimensions, and explore their impact
on organized labor's current predicament and its prospects for survival
and prosperity is to employ a cross-national perspective offered by
Lowell Turner . 14 He argues that labor-management relations are structured by two variables: "first, the extent to which unions, as a broad
national pattern, are integrated into the processes of managerial
decision making, especially concerning work reorganization; and second, the existence of laws or corporatist bargaining arrangements .... " 15 These two variables are the defining elements for four
Yanarella & Green, supra note 2.
See J. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1990).
MARTIN KENNEY & RICHARD FLORIDA, BEYOND MASS PRODUCTION: THE JAPANESE
SYSTEM AND ITS TRANSFER TO THE U.S. (1993).
9. Knuth Dohse et al., From "Fordism" to "Toyotism"? The Social Organization of
the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 14 PoL. & Soc'Y 117 (1985).
10. See Rianne Mahon, From Fordism to?: New Technology, Labour Markets, and
Unions, 8 ECON. & INDUST. DEMOCRACY 5 (1987).
11. See MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM
CONCEPT (1988).
12. See ALAIN LIPIETZ, TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER: POSTFORDISM, ECOLOGY,
AND DEMOCRACY (Malcolm Slater, trans., 1992).
13. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5.
14. LOWELL TURNER, DEMOCRACY AT WORK: CHANGING WORLD MARKETS AND THE
FUTURE OF LABOR UNIONS 12 (1991).
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labor relations systems summarized in Figure 1 and briefly outlined
below.
Figure I
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SYSTEMS
Integration into Managerial Process
Yes
Laws or
Corporatist
Bargaining
Arrangements

1

Yes

Germany

No

3
Japan

No
2
4

United
States

Model I describes the German labor-management relations system
in which labor unions are integrated into the process of managerial
decision making through the medium of union-dominated works councils.16 This integration occurs from a base independent of management, because it is supported by the Works Constitution Act of 1952
and by a corporatist bargaining structure 17 in which a nationally
cohesive labor union movement, coordinated by one cohesive labor
federation (the DGB or Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and supported
by the Social Democratic Party, engages in regional collective bargaining with centralized employer associations to reinforce the labormanagement system. 18
Model II describes a labor-management relations system which
Turner does not explicitly discuss. His analysis suggests Model II
would exist in countries where adversariallabor-management relations
prevail, national labor law is supportive of arms-length negotiations,
and corporatist bargaining structures are strong. 19 In Model II countries, these three elements would be rooted in a nationally cohesive
labor union movement coordinated by a peak labor federation which
engages in collective bargaining with centralized employer associa-

16. Id.
17. Turner defines corporatist structure as "regularized peak or subpeak negotiation
between relatively cohesive units of business and labor, with the formal or informal backing
of the state." /d. at 16.
18. Id. at 95-103.
19. TURNER, supra note 14, at 12-15.
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tions, enjoys popular support, and plays a critical role in the life of
a nationally prominent political party. 20
Model III describes the Japanese lean production labor-management relations system which prevails, not only in Japan, but also in
Japan's North American non-union transplants. 21 In this model, workers and their enterprise unions are integrated into the process of
managerial decision making in a decidedly subordinate way. 22 Integration is defined on management's terms, and corporatist bargaining
arrangements do not exist, because workers and their unions are not
supported by national laws which provide them with an independent
legal basis for participation and because labor unions are fragmented
and enjoy little popular and political support. 23
Model IV describes the United States and Canadian labor-management relations systems dominated by adversarial arms-length bargaining. Unions are not integrated into managerial decision making
because the National Labor Relations Act and Canadian labor laws
do not provide the legal basis for independent participation in managerial decision making, 24 although integration does occur on a single
firm or plant basis at management's initiative. 25 Finally, corporatist
bargaining structures are weak. 26 In both countries, organized labor's
peak associations-the AFL-CIO in the United States, the Canadian
Labor Congress (CLC) and the Canadian Federation of Labor (CFL),
among others, in Canada-are fragmentedY However, organized
labor in Canada, unlike the United States, enjoys popular and political
party support sufficient to allow it to have a meaningful impact on
labor law reform. 28
These four labor relations systems are not equally favorable to
the interests of organized labor. Turner argues that if labor unions
are to survive and prosper, they must abandon adversarial armslength bargaining strategies and become integrated into a firm's managerial decision making. 29 He asserts, however, that managerial integration involves ''substantial participation . . . with management
regarding plans to reorganize work before actual decisions are made
on the shape of the new organization and the pace of implementa-

20.
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tion. " 30 This will be a dangerous move, he argues, unless union
participation is supported by national legislation which creates a legal
framework for labors' independent status in managerial decision making.31
Union participation also requires a corporatist bargaining structure, the dynamic element of which is "[a] cohesive labor movement
... one that includes a relatively small number of national unions
and is effectively, if not formally, centralized, either through a dominant central labor federation or through the centralizing influence of
one dominant union. " 32 Unless unions become integrated on these
terms, Turner argues, they will be subordinated to management and
continue to decline. 33 In sum, his analysis suggests that change is
necessary. 34 If North American organized labor keeps to its present
Model IV path or accepts a Model III lean production-based labormanagement relations system, its future will be bleak. 35 To survive
and prosper, unions will need to move towards the Model I German
co-determination system, but in doing so, they will have to confront
a formidable dual task: building a cohesive labor movement and
altering the current labor law paradigm.
II.

THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF NORTH AMERICAN
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

Legal paradigms are models which draw upon a nation's history
and traditions and are reflected in its public law-its constitution,
statutes, administrative law, and judicial decisions-and in private
agreements. The four labor-management relations systems described
in Section I are each based on a labor law paradigm. 36 These paradigms, depending upon the particular nation's labor history and
practices, may be grounded in constitutional principles regarding
employment and work, by legislation establishing the general structure
for labor-management relations and the respective roles of labor,
management, and government as they may be refined by administrative and judicial decisions and by labor and management's collectively
bargained agreements and grievance arbitration decisionsY Labor law
paradigms, thereby, express the existing labor-management consensus.
In times of paradigm change, they also structure the strategies of the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

supra note 14, at 16.
Id.
/d. at 17.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
TuRNER, supra note 14, at 13.
See supra notes 16-18, 24-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16-18, 24-28 and accompanying text.
TuRNER,
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participants, establish the parameters for their interaction, and define
the prospects for legal change. In North America, labor relations are
governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) paradigm and
its Canadian variant. 38

2.

The National Labor Relations Act Paradigm

The United States labor-management relations system is structured by the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935. 39
Since its passage, the NLRA has been amended most notably by the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947, 40 and
its meanings have been elaborated by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) and the federal courts. 41 This legislation and its administrative and judicial case law constitute the paradigm's public law
component to which must be added the substantial body of private
law contained in labor and management's collectively bargained agreements and grievance arbitration awards.
The NLRA paradigm carves out a limited role for government
regulation of labor-management relations. The National Labor Relations Act was passed for the express purpose of promoting industrial
peace by granting workers the legal right to freely choose a union,
bargain collectively with management, and take concerted action to
advance their organizing and bargaining rights. 42 The paradigm was
further nar-rowed by the NLRA's Taft-Hartley Act amendments, 43
which placed substantial curbs on union power by creating six unfair
labor practices and by authorizing state governments in Section 14(b)
to enact Right to Work statutes which prohibit union membership as
a condition of employment. 44 With these changes, Taft-Hartley abandoned the Wagner Act's encouragement of organizing and collective
bargaining and substituted a policy which provided that the NLRA
would be '"a neutral guarantor of equal rights or, at least, reasonably

38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988); CANADA LABOUR CoDE, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993).
39. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of
July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § I, 49 Stat. 449).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § I, 61
Stat. 136).
41. RAYMOND L. HOOLER & GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR
LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 76 (1992); Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor
Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 65-88 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
42. Paul Rainsberger, The Constraints of Public Policy: Legal Perspectives on the Decline
of the Labor Movement Since World War II, in U.S. LABOR RELATIONS 1945-1989 91, 94 (Bruce
Nissen ed., 1990).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988).
44. William J. Moore & Robert J. Newman, The Effects of Right to Work Laws, 38
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 571, 515 (1985).
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balanced rights." ' 45 As a consequence, "Taft-Hartley represents [an]
institutionalization of the perception of unions as a third force in the
work force. " 46
The National Labor Relations Act provides for labor's right to
organize by establishing procedures for workers to select a union 47
which include an NLRB-supervised election campaign, 48 a secret ballot,49 and, if the union wins, NLRB certification of the union as the
bargaining unit. 50 The NLRB also imposes on employers and employees the duty to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, and terms
or conditions of employment including grievance rights and procedures, but the statute does not explicitly limit the subjects of good
faith bargaining. 51 Instead, it is the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB
v. Wooster Division of Borg- Warner52 which restricts bargaining to
mandatory subjects-wages, hours, and terms or conditions of employment-and leaves all other bargainable subjects to management's
discretion. 53 As a consequence, the Supreme Court, by recognizing a
broad category of permissive bargaining subjects, most often alluded
to in management rights clauses of collective contracts, preserved
management's exclusive right to make strategic decisions, and, subject
to collective contractual provisions, to govern the workplace. In order
to protect labor's legal right to organize and unionized labor's collective bargaining rights, 54 the NLRA prohibits unfair labor practices
and authorizes the NLRB to hear and, subject to judicial review, to
decide unfair labor practice claims. 55
This public law component created the structure for labor's
organizing and contracting behavior and allowed labor and management the freedom to complete the paradigm by creating a body of
private law contained in their collectively bargained agreements in-

45. Adams, North American Industrial Relations: Divergent Trends in Canada and the
United States, 128 INT'L LAB. REv. 47 (1989).
46. Rainsberger, supra note 42, at 98.
47. 29 u.s.c. § 159 (1988).
48. 29 u.s.c. § 153 (1988).
49. 29 u.s.c. § 159 (1988).
so. !d.
51. 29 u.s.c. §§ 141-88 (1988).
52. 356 u.s. 342 (1958).
53. /d. at 349. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed and explained its Borg- Warner
decision in Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) and First Nat'!
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road
from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68
VA. L. REv. 1447 (1982) (arguing that a union's bargaining power is limited by the principle
that a union may not interfere with an employer's product market decisions); Note, The Impact
of the Borg-Warner Case on Collective Bargaining, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1225 (1959).
54. 29 u.s.c. § 158 (1988).
55. /d.
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eluding provisions for grievance settlement. As Thomas Kochan, Harry
Katz, and Robert McKersie have observed, "[t]he NLRA did not
dictate the terms or conditions of employment but endorsed a process
by which the parties could shape their own substantive contract
terms. " 56 The UA W has used this limited regulatory framework to
organize the nation's auto workers and to negotiate highly formalized
and detailed collective bargaining agreements with the Big Three
automakers. The 1948 GM-UA W agreement defined the three major
elements of the NLRA paradigm's private law component: 57 first, a
three year wage and fringe benefit structure negotiated by the UAW's
national office; 58 second, a job control-focused work rule structure59
whose "general principles and rules governing seniority, job classifications, production conditions, and mechanisms for resolving grievances" are negotiated by the UAW's national office and whose
detailed job descriptions are negotiated by each local for the plants
it represents; 60 and third, a contract administered by the local union
under the supervision of the national office. 61
The Canadian labor-management relations system bears the imprint of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and bestows upon
provincial governments the primary responsibility for private sector
labor relations. 62 This Canadian legislation also creates a limited
regulatory labor-management relations system to promote industrial
peace by granting workers the limited legal right to freely choose a
union, to bargain collectively with management, and to take concerted
action. 63 To implement these rights, federal and provincial labor
relations boards, subject to judicial review, are responsible for "union
certification, unfair labor practices, and in some cases, industrial
conflict and the regulation of internal union affairs. " 64 Otherwise,
the Canadian paradigm has been completed at labor and manage-

56. THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 24 (1986).
51. John Holmes, New Production Technologies, Labour and the North American Auto
Industry, in LABOUR, ENVIRONMENT AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 87, 100 (G.J.R. Linge & G.A.
van den Knaaf eds., 1989).
58. /d.
59. Job control-focused collective agreements link a worker's pay to the wage rates for
a specific job classification and job access to the worker's seniority. /d. at 101.
60. /d.
61. /d.
62. Adams, supra note 45, at 47.
63. /d.
64. H.W. ARTHURS ET AL., LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA 57 (1988).
All Canadian provinces, except Quebec, have a labor relations statute which establishes a labor
relations tribunal for the private sector. "Tn Quebec, such functions are divided between a
Labor Court/Tribunal du travail and department officials called commissioners/commissaires."
/d.
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ment's initiative by means of collectively bargained agreements and
grievance arbitration. 65
The Canadian paradigm differs in some significant ways from
its United States counterpart. Labor law is not based on a single
federal statute, but, as noted above, upon both federal and provincial
legislation. 66 Yet "the various Canadian [provincial] statutes are sufficiently similar to allow us to speak of a distinctive Canadian model
of representation . . .. '' 67 Canadian labor laws are more supportive
of union labor, because they do not contain a Taft-Hartley type
provision which qualifies a union's right to exclusive representation
and treats the union as "a third force" in the workplace. 68 Nor does
Canadian federal legislation recognize the right of the provinces to
enact Right to Work statutes. 69 Other significant statutory provisions
include stricter union security agreements, stronger unfair labor practices provisions, limited use of replacement workers, labor relations
board-imposed first collective contracts when the parties disagree, and
more restricted judicial review of labor board decisions. 70
Canadian labor law contains more favorable procedures for union
recognition and certification based upon the card system. 71 Ontario's
Labor Relations Act, for example, provides that if a union signs at
least 55 percent of the employees, the union can be automatically
certified as the bargaining agent. 72 A vote is necessary only if a union
signs less than 55 percent, but more than 45 percent. 73 Moreover,
Canadian labor law does not clearly restrict the subjects of good faith
bargaining to mandatory subjects and leaves all other bargainable
(permissive) subjects to management's discretion. 74 Arthurs has found
that Canadian labor arbitrators are divided between a '''reserved
rights' approach ... premised on the assumption that management
... does not surrender its traditional right to manage ... [and one
that] treat[s] the collective agreement as creating a new legal regime
that puts the trade union and employer on an equal footing. "' 5 As a
consequence, Canadian labor law may not be as wedded as the United

65.
66.
67.

/d.
/d.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. ch. 228, § 7 (1980) (Can.).

Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1806 n.l34 (1983).
68. ARTHURS, supra note 64, at 167.
69. Rainsberger, supra note 42, at 98.
70. Kenneth W. Thornicroft, Unions, Union Dues, and Political Activity: A Canada/
U.S. Comparative Analysis, 41 LAB. L.J. 846, 846 (1990).
71. Weiler, supra note 67, at 1806-11.
/d.

ARTHURS, supra note 64, at 298.
/d.
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States to protecting management's exclusive right to make strategic
decisions and may be open to organized labor's participation on the
basis of a collectively bargained contract.
Canadian labor law, having created an NLRA structure for
labor's organizing and contracting behavior, has allowed labor and
management to complete the paradigm by creating a body of private
law contained in their collectively bargained agreements. Within this
framework, the Canadian auto workers, as members of the UA W's
Canadian region, relied upon provincial labor law to develop the
Canadian equivalent of the Fordist adversarial labor-management
relations system, one also defined by highly formalized and detailed
collective bargaining agreements modeled on the three major elements
of the 1948 GM-UAW model. 76 This labor relations system, which
defined life on the shop floor during the "glory years," began to
disintegrate during the era of capitalist industrial restructuring and
double-digit inflation of the 1980s. 77 The UAW's acceptance of the
Big Three automaker's demands for concessions and cooperation led
to unbridgeable differences which forced the Canadian UAW to break
away by 1985 and pursue a traditional adversarial collective bargaining
and a no concessions strategy. 78 Thereafter, the Japanese transplants
presented a new challenge to the separate labor-management visions
of both unions.

B. The Lean Production Labor Relations Model
Japan has been the major force behind the global restructuring
of the automobile industry, its organization of work, and its labormanagement relations. In the space of one decade, six Japanese
automobile firms built assembly plants across the North American
industrial heartland and four Japanese firms-Mazda, Mitsubishi,
Suzuki, and Toyota-established joint ventures with the Big Th"ree
automakers. 79 With them the Japanese brought their lean production
methods and labor relations system which had made them a competitive force in the international automobile marketplace. 80
Lean production's principles and practices have created a crisis
for the Fordist regime of industrial production, its labor relations

See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 33-43.
See generally Sam Gindin, Breaking Away: The Formation of the Canadian Auto
Workers, 29 STuD. IN PoL. EcoN. 63 (1989) (arguing that increasing differences in goals forced
split in UAW); Charlotte Yates, The Internal Dynamics: Explaining Canadian Autoworkers'
Militancy in the 1980's, 31 STUD. IN POL. EcoN. 73 (1990) (arguing that the CAW has increased
union power in the workplace but faces significant future challenges).
79. KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra note 8, at 95-102; see supra note I.
80. Jd. at 102-05.
76.
77.
78.
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system, and the NLRA paradigm, because lean production rejects the
basic elements of the Fordist production model, its adversarial style
of labor-management relations, and the legal rights of North American
workers. Under lean production, wages, work rules, and jobs are not
negotiated, because the workers do not belong to autonomous unions. 81
Workers, or "production associates," are paid essentially the same
wage, except for a small supplement received by team leaders. 82 Work
rules are flexible and job classifications are minimal, because the team
concept emphasizes multitask training, job rotation, and performance
of housekeeping and maintenance duties. 83 Since corporatist bargaining arrangements do not exist and labor has no independent legal
basis for participation, 84 lean production's cooperative labor-management relations mean that workers are integrated into the process of
decision making on management's terms.
Lean production and its labor relations system have challenged
both the United States and Canadian labor-management relations
systems and their legal paradigms in two settings. 85 In a non-union
Asian transplant setting, lean production practices have subtly undermined their workers' NLRA right to organize and made it difficult,
if not impossible, for the UA W and CAW to organize transplant
workers. 86 In a union setting, lean production at the Japanese-Big
Three joint ventures and Saturn has not so much threatened union
organizing or collective bargaining rights, as it has challenged the
national UA W and CAW offices to design a labor-management strategy in cooperation with their union locals for collective bargaining
and shop floor representation which effectively protects their members' interestsY
III. NORTH AMERICAN LABOR LAW AND LEAN PRODUCTION AT
NoN-UNION JAPANESE TRANSPLANTS
The United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Workers have
faced their toughest challenge from the five non-union Asian transTuRNER, supra note 14, at 218-19.
KENNEY & fLORIDA, supra note 8, at 112.
TuRNER, supra note 14, at 219-20.
/d. at 13.
Daniel Drache & Harry Glasbeek, The New Fordism in Canada: Capital's Offensive,
Labour's Opportunity, 27 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 517 (1989); Stephen Hertzenberg, Whither Social
Unionism? Labor and Restructuring in the U.S. Auto Industry in THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING : NORTH AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENTS RESPOND 314 (Jane Jenson & Rianne Mahon
eds., 1993) (hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING); Donald M. Wells, Recent Inno81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

vations in Labour-Management Relations: R_isks and Prospects for Labour in Canada and the
United States in THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING 287, supra; Charlotte Yates, Curtains or
Encore: Possibilities for Restructuring in the Canadian Auto Industry in THE CHALLENGE OF
RESTRUCTURING 337, supra.
86. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70-73.
87. Id. at 61-70.
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plant firms: Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru-lsuzu.
Operating outside the narrow regulatory confines of the NLRA paradigm and within the framework of the lean production labor-management relations, these transplant auto firms have avoided
unionization by employing a two-part, union substitution and union
suppression strategy. 88

A.

Asian Transplant Union Substitution Strategy

The Japanese labor-management relations system has been transferred, in large part, to the North American non-union Asian transplants.89 The transplant firms have relied upon a union substitution
strategy which employs an interrelated set of lean production-based
decisions about plant location, worker recruitment and training, and
production practices to integrate their workers into the process of
shop floor decision making in a "decidedly subordinate way. " 90
The transplant firms have selected greenfield sites for their lean
production facilities, because these small town locations have permitted them to exercise virtually unqualified strategic control in selecting
a work force with minimal union experience. 91 Honda drew upon an
applicant pool composed of ''young, inexperienced workers without
previous manufacturing experience. " 92 Nissan selected Smyrna, a small
town in Tennessee, for this reason and because the automaker believed
that the state law would discourage union organizing . .In making its
site selection decision, Nissan "avoid[ed] areas with strong traditions
of labor union organization ... [and] selected Tennessee where labor
union organizing is hampered by 'Right to Work' statutes, largely in
order to minimize the likelihood of worker representation by the
United Auto Workers Union." 93
·
Nissan and other transplants have also employed recruitment,
training, and production processes to screen in lean production team
players and screen out pro-union applicants. 94 At Subaru-lsuzu, for

88. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 110 (1990).
89. See Richard Florida & Martin Kenney, Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of
Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S., 56 AM. Soc. REv. 381 (1991); and KENNEY &
FLORIDA, supra note 8.
90. TuRNER, supra note 14, at 13.
91. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70; see supra note 1.
92. HARUO SHIMADA & JOHN PAUL McDUFFIE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND "HUMANWARE": JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES 53
(1987).
93. Andrew Mair et al., The New Geography of Automobile Production: Japanese
Transplants in North America 64 EcoN. GEOG. 352, 366 (1988); KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra
note 2, at I 01.
94. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70. ·
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example, the recruitment process included a questionnaire with statements on labor-management relations designed to eliminate applicants
with pro-union sympathies and group exercises· to test an applicant's
ability to perform as a team player. 95 Subaru-Isuzu's worker training
has emphasized the transmission of company values and its use of
the team concept, kaizen, and just-in-time lean production practices
has maximized managerial shop floor control. 96 Of these, the team
concept was the most potent control mechanism, because SubaruIsuzu used it not merely to reorganize and set the pace for work, but
also to frustrate labor organizing by creating a management-defined
shop floor culture. 97 Subaru-lsuzu and the other transplants have been
enormously successful. None of their assembly plants have been
organized. 98 Lean production, however it may be practiced, is firmly
in place at the Asian transplants where management-defined employee
participation is limited to the shop floor.
The Asian transplant firms' location, recruitment, and training
practices do not violate the NLRA and Canadian labor law which is
largely limited to labor organizing, collective bargaining, and concerted action. 99 The labor laws of both countries do not clearly extend
to organized labor the right to participate in these strategic decisions,
because they are managerial prerogatives. Although lean production,
as a production method, is unlikely to raise any NLRA or Canadian
labor law issues, management's use of lean production teams in a
non-union setting may intrude upon their worker's right to organize
an autonomous union. 100
The team concept has become the subject of considerable legal
controversy in the United States. 101 Whether the use of lean production

95. Laurie Graham, Screening for a Union Free Environment 68 (1991) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University).
96. Laurie Graham, Inside a Japanese Transplant: A Critical Perspective, 20 WoRK &
OccUPATIONS 147, 161-62 (1993).
97. Id.
98. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 72.
99. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988) and Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993).
The Canadian national statute is supplemented by provincial legislation. See supra notes 62-65,
and accompanying text.
100. KENNEY & fLORIDA, supra note 8, at 284.
101. NLRA Section 8(a)(2) has been the subject of considerable scholarly discussion. See,
e.g., David H. Brody, The Future of Labor-Management Cooperative Efforts Under Section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 41 VAND. L. REv. 545 (1988); Shaun G. Clarke,
Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section
8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021 (1987); Andrew A. Lipskey, Participatory Management Schemes,
the Law, and Workers' Rights: A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 667
(1990); Robert B. Moberly, Worker Participation and Labor-Management Cooperation Through
Collective Bargaining, 15 STETSON L. REv. 99 (1985); Note, Participatory Management Under
Section 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1736 (1985).
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teams by non-union Asian transplants violates the National Labor
Relations Act involves two related questions. First, is a lean production team a Section 2(5) labor organization? To be a labor organization, the employees must participate; the employee group must exist
"for the purpose of dealing with the employer"; and must concern
itself with "'grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work. "' 102 Second, if the team is a
labor organization, the next question is whether the employer has
committed a Section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice by taking actions
"to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to
it. ... , 103
These questions cannot be answered in the abstract, because it is
not clear how individual Asian transplant firms may use production
teams, nor is there any judicial consensus on whether these production
teams violate the NLRA. The federal appellate courts are divided
over whether the NLRA's central purpose to prevent industrial strife
can be best furthered by an interpretation of the statute which promotes an adversarial or a cooperative style of labor-management
relations.
The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co., 104 interpreted Section 2(5) to provide the widest opportunity for
workers to organize autonomous unions and bargain at arms-length
with management. 105 A federal court applying Cabot Carbon would
give a broad reading to Section 2(5)'s "dealing with" language and,
thereby, leave very little room for a lean production team to qualify
as anything other than a labor organization. If an employee group
made proposals or recommendations, had discussions, asked questions, or offered information involving "grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work" 106
which "an employer could simply accept or reject without discussion, " 107 the employee group would be a Section 2(5) labor organization because it would be "dealing with" the employer. The federal
court would then turn to Section 8(a)(2), give a broad reading to its
"dominates" language, condemn a firm's conduct if it merely created
a potential for domination of the transplant team, and, thereby,
102. John Schmidman & Kimberlee Keller, Employee Participation Plans as Section 8(a)(2)
Violations, 35 LAB. L.J. 772, 773 (1984).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
104. 360 u.s. 203 (1959).
105. /d. at 218.
106. Schmidman & Keller, supra note 102, at 773.
107. Harold J. Datz, Employee Participation Programs: Are They Lawful Under the
National Labor Relations Act?, 8 LAB. LAw. 81, 83 (1992).
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impose a comprehensive ban on any employer involvement in the
formation of a labor organization. 108
The Supreme Court's Cabot Carbon analysis has, however, lost
favor with the NLRB and the federal courts of appeal which prefer
instead an interpretation which promotes a cooperative style of labormanagement relations. The NLRB or a federal court, following the
Board's decision in General Foods Corp. 109 and the Sixth Circuit's
decision in NLRB v. Streamway Division of Scott and Fetzer Co., 110
would focus on the concept of representation, not mentioned in
Section 2(5), and conclude that a transplant team was not a Section
2(5) labor organization because it did not "represent" other employees, but instead involved mere "participation" by all members of the
plant. 111 Alternatively, the NLRB or a federal court could rely upon
the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v. Bell-Aerospace Co. 112 and
NLRB v. Yeshiva University 113 and conclude that a lean production
team is not a Section 2(5) labor organization because it is composed
of managerial employees. 114
If a federal appellate court did find that a lean production team
was a labor organization, it would turn to Section 8(a)(2) and rely
upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB 115 which held that the NLRA did not proscribe
mere cooperation, but only employer conduct which overrode the
employee's free choice and constituted actual domination, interference, or support of a labor organization.l 16 A federal court, relying
upon Chicago Rawhide, would also find support from the Sixth
Circuit's decisions in Federal Mogul Corporation v. NLRB 117 and
NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc. 118 and the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Hertzka and Knowles v. NLRB. 119
108. Barbara A. Lee, Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation: An Anomalous
Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 38 LAB. L.J. 206, 216 (1987); Note,
Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1663 (1983).
109. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
110. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
111. Datz, supra note 107, at 86; Raymond L. Hogler, Employee Involvement Programs
and NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co.: The Developing Interpretation of Section 8(a)(2), 35 LAB.
L.J. 21 (1984).
112. 416 u.s. 267 (1974).
113. 444 u.s. 672 (1980).
114. Arthur P. Menard & Anne K. Morrill, Are Faculty Members Scholars or Managers?:
The Yeshiva Case, 30 LAB. L. REv. 754 (1979); Harold Kent, Note, Collective Authority and
Technical Expertise: Reexamining the Managerial Employee Exclusion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 694
(1981).
115. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
116. /d. at 167.
117. 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968).
118. 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984).
119. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).

c

NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE

1995]

433

These Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Court of Appeals decisions are
extremely relevant because all the Japanese transplants, the Big ThreeJapanese joint ventures and Saturn, are located in these three circuits.
As Theodore J. St. Antoine observed, these
courts of appeals have departed from a strict reading of Section
8(a)(2) on such avowed policy grounds as rejection of a "purely
adversarial model of labor relations" and acceptance of a "cooperative arrangement [where it] reflects a choice freely arrived at and
where the organization is capable of being a meaningful avenue for
the expression of employee wishes." 120

In fact, the Sixth Circuit has said that the NLRA "must be construed
to take into account modern industrial practices, such as employee
participation programs." 121 So these federal court decisions, unless
reversed by the Supreme Court, have the potential to redefine labor
relations at UA W -organized auto plants, especially the joint ventures
and Saturn, and to impair the union's ability to organize the transplants.

B.

Asian Transplant Union Suppression Strategy

The UAW and CAW have encountered substantial difficulties in
organizing the Asian transplants whose greenfield locations and teambased hiring, training, and production practices have allowed them
to discourage union organizing efforts. 122 The UAW and CAW have
not made serious attempts to organize the Toyota Georgetown, Kentucky or Cambridge, Ontario plants. 123 The UAW initiated an organizing drive at Honda in Marysville, Ohio, but discontinued the effort
in 1985. 124 In the interim, the CAW has attempted sporadically, but
unsuccessfully, to organize Honda in Alliston, Ontario. 125 SubaruIsuzu also remains non-union. 126 Only the Nissan and Hyundai plants
have been objects of serious UA W and CAW organizing efforts. 127
The United Auto Workers' first major transplant organizing drive
began at Nissan in Smyrna, Tennessee where its principal issues were
injuries and work loads. 128 The UAW's organizing effort was disad-

120. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Legal and Economic Implications of Union-Management Cooperation: The Case of GM and the UA W, 33 LAW QuADRANGLE: NOTES 46, 52 (1989).
121. Datz, supra note 107, at 86.
122. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70.
123. ld. at 70-71.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
KENNEY &

/d. at 71.
/d.

/d.
/d.
Jane Slaughter, Behind the UA W's Defeat at Nissan, LAB. NoTEs, Sept. 1989, at I;
FLORIDA, supra note 2, at 266.
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vantaged from the outset by Nissan's location in a Right to Work
state with a unionization rate of 13.5 percent, by Nissan's recruitment
methods which screened out applicants with union sympathies or
experience, and by its worker training and team-based production
methods which permitted the automaker to control the workers' shop
floor culture. 129
When the organizing drive began, Nissan took the typical antiunion position "that there [wa]s no need for [their] workers to be
represented by 'third parties,"' but then added a statement of formal
neutrality: "If the employees choose to join the union at any time
we will, of course, abide by that choice." 130 Then the automaker
proceeded to conduct a vigorous anti-union campaign, asserting its
NLRA Section 8(c) free speech right: "Nissan used its plant-wide
video system and the daily work group meetings to hammer home its
anti-union message .... The day before the vote, Nissan shut down
the line for up to an hour on each shift for captive audience meetings."131 On July 26, 1989, Nissan workers voted 1,622 to 711, 69
percent to 31 percent, against UAW representations. 132 In the wake
of the defeat, it appears that worker concerns about safety were not
all that salient, nor were their increased work loads. 133 In an antiunion culture, most employees were more concerned that the union's
presence would create an adversarial atmosphere. 134
The Canadian Auto Workers began its organizing drive at Hyundai's Bromont plant in 1990 where the central issues were the Korean
auto firm's job rotation work rules and sliding-scale pension plan. 135
Hyundai vigorously opposed the CAW's organizing efforts, but by
December 1990 the union had acquired 350 signed union cards from·
the plant's 700 workers, enough to request the Quebec Department
of Labor to hold a secret ballot on CAW representation.l 36 Still the
union decided to seek another 100 signed union cards because it
believed that the automaker had under reported the plant's employees
''to lull the CAW into a false target that would prevent them from
getting the minimum number of signatures. " 137 The CAW's efforts

129. Phil West, Will Nisson Unionize, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, July 23, 1989, at 0-1.
130. KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra note 8, at 284.
131. Slaughter, supra note 128, at 13; KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra note 2, at 284, 305.
132. Slaughter, supra note 128, at l.
133. Free Ride in Smyrna, THE (LOUISVILLE] CoURIER JouRNAL, July 29, 1989.
134. /d.
135. Lindsay Chappell, CAW Tackles Hyundai Canada: Work Rules and Pensions Cited,
AUTO. NEWS, Feb. 21, 1991, at 6.
136. Francis Shalom, Battle to Form Union at Hyundai Heats Up: CAW Says it is Close
to Having Enough to Hold Vote, THE (MoNTREAL] GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 1990, at Cl.
137. /d.
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were further complicated by a Hyundai employee-initiated petition
against unionization said to be supported by 560 assembly line workers, but which the CAW and pro-union Hyundai workers suspected
was a fraudulent management-initiated effort. 138
In spite of Hyundai's opposition, the CAW continued its organizing efforts, acquired a clear majority of signed union cards, and in
March 1993, applied for certification, a process which could take
"anywhere from a few months to two years." 139 However, CAW's
success, has to be viewed against the backdrop of Hyundai's declining
fortunes in the North American auto marketplace, rumors that it was
contemplating moving its plant to Mexico, and in June, 1993, an
announcement that it will temporarily suspend its Bromont operations
to convert and renovate the plant for the production of a new car,
the Elantra. 140 Since workers at the Bromont plant will not be recalled
until early 1995, it is also likely that the CAW's organizing efforts
will also be placed on hold.
The United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Worker's
mutual failure to organize the Asian transplants raises important labor
law questions. According to the ruling legal consensus, the TaftHartley's Section 14(b) Right to Work provision burdens United States
labor unions because it provides a union-free environment for business
while the absence of that provision in Canadian labor law allows
business no safe haven. Labor law scholars also claim that Canada's
union card procedure enables its unions to be more easily certified
while United States unions must endure a lengthy and arduous organizing campaign followed by a secret ballot. 141 The UA W and
CAW's mutual failure casts doubt on these asserted Canadian legal
advantages and instead suggests that it is the similarities of the NLRA
paradigm and its Canadian variant, which do not intrude upon management's right to make strategic decisions about plant location,
recruitment, training, and production practices, which better explain
the ability of Asian transplant firms in both countries to avoid
unionization.
·
On the American scene, the NLRA's Section 8(c)'s free speech
clause, a Taft-Hartley provision, also helps explain Nissan's victory.J42
The United States Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co. 143 and related NLRB decisions have broadly interpreted Section
138. ld.
139. Jeremy Sinek, Hyundai Workers Want CAW, Avro. NEws, Mar. 29, 1993, at 37.
140. Lindsay Chappell & Jeremy Sinek, Hyundai Recoups, Revises Canada Plant, Avro.
NEws, June 14, 1993, at 4-5.
141. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 88, at 253-61.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
143. 395 u.s. 575 (1969).
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8(c) to grant management considerable power during organizing campaigns, because the NLRB and the Supreme Court permit management
to deliver "a message which would be received by a reasonable listener
as a threat or promise . . . . [including a] predict[ion] that dire
consequences may result from a decision of workers to unionize, as
long as those consequences are not within the direct control of the
employer." 144 In Nissan's case, this probably means that if the UAW
had brought a Section 8 unfair labor practice complaint against the
automaker, the union would have been unlikely to prevail because
the NLRB would have found that Nissan's anti-union videos, t-shirts,
and captive audience meetings held on company time were protected
Section 8(c) speech. Nissan's statement implying that unionization
could mean loss of two employee benefit plans would, however, have
provided a closer case because it was a consequence within the employer's direct control. 145
Summary

The Asian automobile manufacturers, using their lean production
cooperative non-union labor relations practices, have successfully challenged United States and Canadian auto workers unions, their adversarial labor-management relations systems, and their narrow jobcontrol based labor law paradigm. The transplants have made plant
location choices and employed recruitment, training, and lean production practices which create a cooperative style of labor relations
governed by management's commitment to the principles of flexibility
and team-based work organization. 146 At the same time, these lean
production practices have been the basis for a two-part strategy which
has frustrated their workers' NLRA right to organize and has made
it impossible for the UAW and CAW to organize transplant workers.
In fact, the transplants' task was made easier because the UAW was
devastated by membership losses, the labor union movement was
fragmented, corporatist bargaining arrangements were non-existent,
and organized labor lacked popular and political support. 147
IV. NORTH
UA w /CAw

AMERICAN LABOR LAW AND LEAN PRODUCTION AT
PLANTS

The United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Workers
represent workers at the Big Three North American assembly plants

Rainsberger, supra note 42, at 106-07.
Stuart A. Williams, Distinguishing Protected from Unprotected Campaign Speech,
33 LAB. L.J. 265 (1982).
146. See supra notes 91-92, and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 23-24, and accompanying text.
144.
145.
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where the Fordist labor relations system and its NLRA legal foundations are largely in place. 148 Collective bargaining is still based on
an arms-length adversarial relationship, concerns itself almost exclusively with workplace matters, 149 and produces nationally-defined wage
scales, nationally and locally negotiated work rules, and a job-oriented
shop floor. 150 Now the Fordist collectively bargained contract, as the
private legal dimension of the NLRA paradigm and its Canadian
variant, is being re-examined by both management and labor. The
Big Three automakers have negotiated incremental lean production
changes at some of their North American operations, 151 but the major
changes which may foreshadow a paradigm change have occurred at
one Canadian and three United States Big Three-Japanese joint venture assembly plants 152- CAM! (GM-Suzuki), AutoAlliance (FordMazda), Diamond-Star (Mitsubishi-Chrysler), NUMMI (GM-Toyota)
·
- and at GM's Saturn. 153
Organized labor and management's willingness to redefine their
relationship and the nature of their collective bargained agreements
involves not merely the reorganization of work on the shop floor,
but also extends to strategic level matters. 154 Yet, the form of these
private agreements and their meaning for organized labor will be
shaped by the public law component of the NLRA paradigm and its
Canadian variant155 which largely limit labor's contractual rights to
the shop floor, but otherwise recognize the continued pre-eminence
of managerial power. 156 In the United States, for example, whether
labor's rights extended to strategic matters was unclear until the
Supreme Court's decision in Borg-Warner limited the Wagner Act's
good faith bargaining to mandatory subjects. 157 In Canada, labor law
less clearly restricts good faith bargaining, because arbitrators are
divided over whether there are limitations on bargainable subjects. 158
In practice, management in both countries has the right to make
strategic decisions and, unless restricted by labor contract provisions,
to decide workplace governance matters. As a result, organized labor
participates in management's strategic decisions only on management's
terms.
148. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
149. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 58.
ISO. TURNER, supra note 14, at 37.
151. /d. at 42-90.
152. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 60-70.
153. /d.
154. TURNER, supra note 14, at 44.
155. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988); Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993).
156. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988); Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993).
157. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
158. ARTHURS, supra note 64, at 33.
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The New Labor-Management Contracts

The UAW and CAW agreements with the Big Three-Japanese
joint ventures and Saturn have been major departures from the 1948
GM-UAW model for adversarial labor-management relations at the
bargaining table and on the shop floor . 159 Interim labor-management
agreements, also identified as "Letters of Intent" or "Letters of
Understanding," run counter to established United States and Canadian labor law principles governing union organizing which require
that workers select a union. These interim agreements were negotiated
by the UAW and CAW's national offices and were signed by union
and automaker officials before any workers were hired or any cars
were built. 160 These agreements provide that once a work force has
been hired and employed, the UAW and CAW may hold representation elections and, if the union is selected as the bargaining agent,
. it will be entitled to negotiate a contract with the automaker . 161
These interim agreements also strike at the core of the Fordist
collectively bargained workplace contract. As high trust, cooperative
exceptions to the Master Agreements, the UAW and CAW have
negotiated on behalf of workers at the Big Three's North American
auto operations; these interim agreements alter wage scales, work
rules, and a job control-based shop floor on the basis of Japanese
lean production labor relations principles. 162 The workplace contract
provisions, written in very general terms, are governed by the principles of egalitarianism, flexibility, and the team concept. 163 Instead
of wage scales based on seniority and job assignments, workers receive
a common base pay to which may be added a bonus based on quality,
productivity, and performance criteria. 164 Work rules are flexible which
means that seniority and job classifications are largely discarded for
team-based work organization that emphasizes multi-tasked training,
flexible hours, job and shift rotation, and the performance of housekeeping and maintenance duties. 165 Grievances are minimal, because
conflicts on the shop floor are resolved through a consultation procedure.166 Finally, these agreements create a two-tiered workforce with
job security provisions, such as no layoffs except for unforseen or

159. Holmes, supra note 57, at 99-105; see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
160. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 61, 66.
161. Michael R. Powers, The GM-UA W Saturn Agreement: A New Approach to Premature Recognition, 74 VA. L. REv. 89 (1988).
162. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 61-63, 67.
163. /d.
164. /d.
165. /d.
166. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 194.
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catastrophic events, that apply to 80 percent of the workforce, the
permanent workers, but not to the remaining temporary workers. 167
The UA W's interim cooperative labor-management agreements
also contain provisions which go beyond addressing mandatory bargaining subjects regarding the reorganization of work on the shop
floor. Unlike the CAW's CAMI labor agreement, the UA W's agreement extends to permissive bargaining strategic level subjects and
involves union and worker participation in the recruitment and training of workers. 168 The UAW agreements with AutoAlliance, NUMMI,
and Saturn provided that the automakers would hire a percentage of
their employees, often 50 percent, from GM or Ford auto workers. 169
The agreements also provided that the recruitment process would
involve both union and management participation in the evaluation
and selection of workers which the Saturn labor agreement extended
to employee training. 170 In fact, the GM-UAW Saturn agreement went
even further by eliminating Paragraph 8's management rights clause,
a cornerstone of GM-UAW contracts since the 1930's 171 and by extending the principle of joint labor-management participation in the
operation of the firm, to union involvement in the design of the
automobile, the engineering of the plant, the relationships with suppliers and subcontractors, the selection of dealers, and the advertising,
distribution, and sales of the Saturn. 172
In sum, these interim agreements and the contracts that union
locals subsequently negotiated have changed the meaning of the NLRA
paradigm as it is defined by the GM-UA W Fordist labor-management
relations model. Except for Saturn, they have left undisturbed management's strategic level control of the firm while extending managerial control to the shop floor by providing for integration on the
basis of management-defined lean production principles. The GMUAW Saturn Labor Agreement also nominally discards the management rights concept and then, on the basis of lean production and
co-determination principles, provides for labor-management integration at all levels of industrial decision making. 173 So, taken together,
these interim agreements suggest that labor-management integration,
whether limited to shop floor or extended to the board room, would
occur at management's discretion.

167. /d. at 195.
168. /d. at 197.
169. Yanarella & Green, supra
170. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE,
171. Yanarella & Green, supra
172. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE,
173. /d. at 194.

note 2, at 61.
supra note 5, at 197.
note 2, at 62.
supra note 5, at 197-99.

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

440

[Vol. 21

What these interim agreements would mean in practice was far
from clear, because they were written in the vague and high trust
language of lean production's cooperative approach to labor relations.
As a result, their meaning was shaped by two unions' distinctive
approaches to labor management relations: the UAW's commitment
to cooperative labor-management relations and the CAW's attachment
to an adversarial shop floor. The unions' national offices were labor's
voice in worker recruitment and training. Once the union was recognized and local leadership elected, then the national office's relationship with the union's local would shape subsequent contract
negotiations, shop floor practices, and strategic level governance.

A.

Recruitment and Training

The UA W and CAW's distinctive labor management relations
views were reflected in their approaches to worker recruitment and
training. The CAW, given its adversarial shop floor view of labormanagement relations, left worker recruitment and training to CAMI
management while the UAW's commitment to labor-management
cooperation, beginning with NUMMI, led to its active involvement
in both of these managerial activities. 174 The NUMMI-UA W Letter
of Understanding provided that the GM-Toyota joint venture would
hire at least 50 percent of its 2,500 person workforce from among
laid off UAW workers at the former GM-Fremont plant. 175 The
interim agreement also created a Joint Employee Assessment Plan for
NUMMI and UAW personnel to evaluate and select workers on the
basis of their "past attendance, disciplinary record, and attitude
towards Toyota's production and labor relations standards." 176 As a
consequence, the interim agreement did not permit NUMMI management to screen out pro-union applicants, 177 but it did permit the
automaker to select team players, because the former GM workers
would be hired, not on the basis of their GM seniority, but on their
"demonstrated ability and capacity and where those were equal, the
job would go to the employee with the 'greater experience."' 178

174. Paul D. Staudohar, Labor-Management Cooperation at NUMMI, 42 LAB. L.J. 57
(1991).
175. Jane Slaughter, Fremont Workers Will Be Rehired at OM-Toyota Plant-But not
by Seniority, LAB. NoTES, Sept. 17, 1983, at 16.
176. Kathleen V. McPherson, Contract Talks at OM-Toyota Plant May Set New Pal/ern
for Auto Industry, LAB. NoTEs, July 1985, at I.
177. !d.
178. Jane Slaughter, Fremont Workers Will Be Rehired at OM-Toyota Plant-But Not
by Seniority, LAB. NoTES, Sept. 17, 1983, at 16.
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The NUMMI recruitment process served as the model for
AutoAlliance, Diamond-Star, and Saturn. 179 At Saturn, the GM-UAW
Saturn Labor Agreement, provided that GM would give preference
to its UAW-represented workforce in hiring its employees. 180 Saturn's
Consensus Guidelines govern an extensive applicant screening and
selection process conducted by the work unit which needs staff. 181
Work units members use jointly prepared employee application forms
to "explore not only the applicant's skills but something about their
leadership qualities and adaptability to the Saturn culture. " 182 As a
consequence, Saturn's cooperative employment process, like NUMMI's, permits GM to select team players and shape the shop floor
culture. 183 Once workers are hired, the Consensus Guidelines also
govern the joint administration of all training programs. 184 One of
the most extensive and innovative training programs among the Japanese-Big Three joint ventures and Asian transplants, Saturn provides
workers with 200 hours of training yearly . 185 In spite of the appearance
of equal labor-management influence, the training program is clearly
biased against worker and union interests. Only a small portion,
perhaps 30 percent, involves non-transferrable technical training while
the remaining 70 percent focuses upon cultural or attitudinal training;
i.e., indoctrination into the Saturn corporate ideology. 186
B. The Shop Floor
A collectively bargained contract is not completely understood
by its own terms, but, as the document itself contemplates, it will be
defined as it is applied and interpreted on the shop floor and through
the process of grievance arbitration. Unlike the precise language of
the Fordist labor contracts which define a job control shop floor, the
general terms of the Saturn and joint ventures' lean production labor
contracts cede job control to management•·s discretion. As a consequence, the lean production shop floor has provided a wider arena
for labor-management conflict over c9ntract application. In this setting, the meaning of the contract has been shaped by the national

179. For a brief discussion of the AutoAlliance recruitment process, see Richard C. Hill
et al., Flat Rock: Home of Mazda: Social Impact of a Japanese Company on an American
Community in THE AUTO INDUSTRY AHEAD: WHo's DRIVING 69-131 (Peter J. Arnesan ed.,
1989).
180. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 194.
181. ld. at 197.
182. /d.
183. /d.
184. /d.
185. Interview with Gary High, Manager, Human Resource Development, Saturn Corp.,
Spring Hill, Tenn. (Mar. 16, 1993).
186. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 64.
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leadership's continuing involvement and by the local union's internal
struggles, its relationship ·with its national office, and its daily encounters with management on the shop floor and in corporate offices.
The UA W and CAW's continuing involvement in their union
local's activities reflects their distinctive approaches to labor-management relations. While the UA W downplayed "any problems or discontent because they're trying to get recognition [at] . . . Honda,
Nissan, and Toyota's plant in Kentucky, " 187 the CAW has openly
confronted lean production. 188 The CAW's "Statement on the Reorganization of Work" outlined the national union's rejection of lean
production methods and guided its close cooperation with its CAMI
Local 88 and their relations with CAMI management. 189 As the CAW
Research Group on CAMI observed, "The local occupies, or more
accurately shapes, the space between a collective agreement that accommodates aspects of team concept, and a policy statement of the
national union that raises substantial questions about the implications
of JPM. " 190
The consensus within Local 88 and between it and the CAW
national office is missing at NUMMI, AutoAlliance, and Saturn. At
all three plants, the locals appear to be divided into rival caucuses
which differ, not in their commitment to the team concept, but in
terms of two views of labor-management cooperation. 191 The Administration Caucus at NUMMI and USA Caucus at AutoAlliance are
willing to award substantial discretion to management. 192 On the other
hand, the People's Caucus at NUMMI and New Direction Caucus at
AutoAlliance are less trusting of management, seek more effective
union representation, and argue that for ''true teamwork to take place
. . . workers must have a strong and independent union to counter
management's power. " 193 Even at Saturn, the GM-UAW model of
labor-management harmony, Local 1853's recent election revealed its
internal divisions. 194 In March, 1993, Mike Bennett, its president, was
challenged by three rival candidates who were committed to the Saturn
labor-management partnership, but who found considerable support

187. Jane Slaughter, Dissent Grows at California OM-Toyota Plant, LAB. NoTES, Apr.
1987, at 3.
188. David Robertson et al., The Team Concept and Kaizen: Japanese Production Management in a Unionized Canadian Auto Plant, 39 STUD. IN PoL. EcoN. 77, 81 (1992).
189. /d.
190. Id. at 98.
191. JOSEPH FUCINI & Suzy FUCINI, WORKING FOR THE JAPANESE: INSIDE MAZDA'S AMERICAN AUTO PLANT 210 (1990).
192. /d. at 198-201.
193. Id. at 210.
194. Neal Templin, UA W Chief at OM's Saturn Unit Vows to Back Consensus-Management Pact, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1993, at A4.
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for an agenda that called for putting more distance between union
members and bosses. 195 A very divided Saturn local returned Bennett
to office, but only by a bare majority in a run-off election. 196
On the shop floor, management's lean production call for cooperation has restructured power against a viable autonomous local
union in the most subtle ways. Management's quest for shop floor
control begins with rules which require that all employees from the
president to production associates share the same restrooms, parking
spaces, and cafeterias, and dress in the same outfits. 197 So demanding
is management's commitment that disputes have arisen over buttons
and pins. 198 In a more visible way, management, sometimes with the
local union's assent, has further blurred labor-management distinctions by providing a common office space for the union's representatives and management's industrial relations personnel. 199 In the early
years, this approach at AutoAlliance was so successful that many
younger workers did not distinguish between labor and management
representatives. Management representatives at AutoAlliance, like their
counterparts at NUMMI, often counseled against filing grievances in
the name of harmony. 200 As a result, UAW Local 3000 at AutoAlliance, like CAW local 88 at CAMI, has established separate offices
and then faced the real struggle for control of the shop floor.
Shop floor control issues have been defined by the team concept
and the common features of lean production labor relations. The
spare outlines of the interim agreements have made the shop floor
the setting for addressing management's lean production policies on
absences from work, the replacement of sick or injured workers on
the line, shift rotation, a two-track workforce, and grievance and
arbitration procedures. 201 The shop floor has also become the venue
for defining the meaning of the team-based workplace and the critical
role of the team leader. At CAMI, like AutoAlliance, "[t]he position
of team leader is a focal point of tension and conflict between the
union and the company. " 202 Here the shop floor control issue is
whether the team leader is part of the management team or the union

!d.
!d.
Robertson eta!., supra note 188, at 92-93.
See, e.g., FuciNI & FUCINI, supra note 191, at 194-200.
See, e.g., Mike Parker, New Mazda Contract Eases "Management-by-Stress" System,
LAB. NOTES, May 1991, at 5, 6.
200. FUCINI & FUCINI, supra note 191, at 119-21.
201. Lean production shift rotation requires workers to alternate day and night shifts
every other week. The two-track workforce is composed of regular employees and a cadre of
temporaries who have no seniority or union rights.
202. Robertson et a!., supra note 188, at 97.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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team. 203 At AutoAlliance, this struggle may now favor the union local,
because the 1991 Collective Bargaining Agreement provides that a
team leader will be elected and subject to recall by team members. 204
After the vague and high trust language of these interim agreements met the reality of the shop floor, contract negotiations have
focused on the unions' efforts to reduce management's discretion on
the shop floor and to resist management efforts to create an even
tougher lean production workplace. Contract negotiations have also
addressed the union concessions contained in the interim agreements,
but enjoyed by UAW and CAW employees of the Big Three automakers: wage parity, overtime pay, health and pension benefits, and
no strike clauses on health and safety and work standards. The UAW
and CAW have largely prevailed. Collective bargaining agreements
have become more detailed documents and have begun to address the
interests of workers in lean production auto plants.
In sum, the Saturn and joint venture's interim labor agreements,
framed in lean production's vague language, have provided management with the opportunity to define the shop floor on their own
terms. However, management has met with limited success from both
the CAW's well-defined adversarial unionism and from UAW locals'
whose commitment to the team concept and lean production have
not prevented them, in spite of their internal divisions, from humanizing the shop floor on which their members toil.

2.

Labor Law Dimensions
The Saturn and joint ventures' interim labor agreements have the
capacity to fundamentally alter the meaning of the NLRA paradigm
and its Canadian variant. Whether or not these agreements, as private
law, will lead to a paradigm shift depend upon their survival of legal
challenges before the courts and labor relations boards. Although the
NUMMI "Letter of Understanding" was the model for the interim
labor agreements at CAMI, Diamond-Star, AutoAlliance, and Saturn,
it was the GM-UAW Saturn Labor Agreement which became the test
case. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
(NRWLDF) challenged two Saturn agreement provisions: the GMUAW decisions to grant preferential hiring rights to OM's UA Wrepresented employees and to recognize the UAW as the bargaining
agent for the Saturn employees. 205 The NRWLDF claimed that GM
203.
204.

/d.at97.
Steve Babson, Lean or Mean: The M.I. T. Model and Lean Production at Mazda,
44 LAB. ST. J. 3, 19 (1993).
205. Advice Memorandum Issued by NLRB on GM-UA W Saturn Agreement, D.L.R.
(BNA) (June 9, 1986) at E-1, E-2.
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and the UA W in agreeing to the preferential hiring clause, and in
agreeing to the bargaining agent clause, had violated NLRA Sections
8(a)(l), 8(a)(2), 8(a)(3), and 8(b)(l)(a). 206
The NLRB's general counsel dismissed both claims. 207 The pref~
erential hiring rights clause did not discriminate against non-OM
employees, because OM's need for a "ready supply of skilled 'labor'
[wa]s a legitimate and substantial business justification for preferring
its own employees .... " 208 Moreover, the clause was the lawful byproduct of mandatory effects bargaining: 209 "An employer has a duty
to bargain with a union over the economic effects that a management
decision will have on union-represented employees, including a duty
to bargain over preferential hiring treatment. " 210 The bargaining agent
clause did not grant prehire recognition of the UAW, but granted
future recognition if the UAW acquired majority support from Saturn
employees. 211 Subsequently, the NLRB Office of Appeals affirmed
the decision, even though it might be "inconsistent with both Supreme
Court precedent and previous Board decisions. " 212 In sum, the Saturn
case has bestowed NLRB approval on paradigm change by means of
interim agreements.
3. Three Labor-Management Pre-Paradigms
The UA W and CAW's interim agreements and collective contracts with CAMI, AutoAlliance, NUMMI, and Saturn management
contain elements of Fordist adversarialism, Japanese lean production
cooperation, and German co-determination. 213 The agreements anticipate union worker participation which may range from integration
into a lean production-defined shop floor to co-determination-based
involvement in all strategic actions of the firm. 214 How these agreements have operated in practice has depended upon the national union
and its locals whose responses reflect a spectrum of acceptance and
resistance to adversarialism, lean production cooperation, and codetermination. These agreements and labor's experiences with them
may be expressed in terms of three pre-paradigms which foreshadow
the creation of a new labor management relations systems and its
legal paradigm.
206. !d.
207. !d.
208. !d. at E-3.
209. !d. at E-2.
210. Advice Memorandum Issued by NLRB on GM-UA W Saturn Agreement, D.L.R.
(BNA) (June 9, 1986) at E-2.
211. !d. at E-2- E-f
212. See Powers, supra note 161, at 96.
213. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
214. Robertson et al., supra note 188, at 87-98.
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Pre-paradigm I is based on a CAMI-type agreement which establishes a management rights-based labor-management relationship
at the strategic level. At CAM!, management has an unqualified right
to recruit and train workers and, subject to the terms of a vaguely
worded collective contract, to otherwise operate the firm. 215 The
general language of the agreement provides management with the
opportunity to extend its control to the shop floor on the basis of
lean production labor relations principles. 216 But this effort has been
resisted by the CAW and local 88 who are committed to the major
principles of the GM-UAW Fordist adversarial labor-management
relations model. 217 Thus, Pre-paradigm I limits labor's integration to
the shop. floor where it is defined as a blend of lean production and
adversarial labor-management relations and thus provides an arena
for a shop floor struggle between adversarialism and cooperation in
their purest form.
Pre-paradigm II is based on a NUMMI or AutoAlliance-type
collective contract which establishes a minimally qualified management rights-based labor-management relationship at the strategic level
that has permitted the UA W to participate in worker recruitment. 218
Otherwise, NUMMI and AutoAlliance management have an unqualified right, subject to the terms of high-trust and vaguely worded
collective contracts, to operate their firms. 219 The collective agreement,
as in Pre-paradigm I, also provides management with the opportunity
to extend its control to the shop floor by employing lean production
labor relations practices. However, over time, the struggle which
occurs on the shop floor will be a mixed response by contending local
union caucuses about how best to accomplish the objectives of lean
production's cooperative labor management relations. 220 Thus, Preparadigm II limits labor's integration, except for its worker recruitment role, to the shop floor where it is defined in lean production's
cooperative labor-management relation~ terms and provides an arena
for a struggle between contending local union caucuses over the
meaning of cooperation.
Pre-paradigm III is based on a Saturn-type collective contract
which discards the management rights clause and extends union joint
participation beyond the shop floor 221 to strategic level involvement

215. /d.
216. /d.
217. /d.
218. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
221. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 191-201.
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in worker recruitment and training, the design of the Saturn and the
plant, the selection of suppliers and subcontractors, and the advertising, distribution, and sales of the automobile. 222 The collective agreement, thereby, provides management with an even greater opportunity
to exercise its control by applying lean production and co-determination labor relations principles to all aspects of industrial decision
making. As a consequence, the shop floor struggle between contending
local union caucuses about how best to accomplish the objectives of
lean production's cooperative labor management relations is framed
in terms of the wider pressures for labor's strategic cooperation on
management's terms. Thus, Pre-paradigm III nominally extends labor's integration to all levels of industrial decision making from the
shop floor to the board room where it is defined in lean production
and co-determination labor-management relations terms and provides
an arena for a struggle between contending local union caucuses over
the meaning of cooperation. Yet the union's almost complete integration makes the task of maintaining its independence more difficult,
because jointness is practiced on management's terms.
4.

Summary

The National Labor Relations Act and its Canadian variant may
not be defined in the years to come by the Fordist adversarial labormanagement collective agreements which largely prevail at the Big
Three's North American operations, but by an agreement defined in
terms of one of the three pre-paradigms. Which one might it be?
Lowell Turner argues that if unions are to survive and prosper in a
competitive international arena, they need to be integrated into a
firm's managerial decision making. 223 In this case, Pre-paradigms I
and II would not appear to be acceptable, because the CAW and
VA W locals at CAMI, AutoAlliance, and NUMMI do not "substantial[ly] particip[ate] ... with management regarding plans to reorganize work before actual decisions are made .... " 224 Saturn's
Consensus Guidelines suggest OM's labor-management jointness would
satisfy Turner's criteria of "substantial participation, " 225 but Saturn's
Pre-paradigm III approach to cooperative labor-management226 would
be an unwise choice, because union participation is not supported by
national legislation which provides a legal framework for labor's

222. /d.
223. TURNER, supra note 14, at 17-18.
224. /d. at 16.
225. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
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independent status in managerial decision making. 227 As a consequence, Saturn seems to be merely a model for union subordination
to management and a prescription for further decline into enterprise
unionism.
If labor law reform will be difficult because corporatist bargaining
structures are weak and organized labor's political strength is limited,
then organized labor might be well advised to pursue an adversarial
collective bargaining strategy. In this case, an otherwise dismal prediction for the UA W's future may be brightened by considering the
CAW's Pre-paradigm I adversarial approach to CAMI shop floor
labor-management relations. Here the question is whether CAMI will
serve as the basis for a Model II labor relations system. 228 In fact,
Turner has observed that whether his thesis is "flawed or at least in
need of modification" may turn on the Canadian experience which
may provide an alternative road for unions to explore in addressing
the challenges of work reorganization. 229 Canadian labor does enjoy
popular support and plays an active role in the New Democratic
Party, but there is room for doubt that Canada will be able to acquire
Model II characteristics, because corporatist bargaining structures are
too weak, its labor federation is fragmented, and collective bargaining
is not well coordinated.
V.

THE NLRA

IN A

Posr-FoRDIST ERA

The National Labor Relations Act paradigm continues to serve
as the legal foundation for Fordist model of adversarial labor relations. At the same time, the NLRA paradigm and its Canadian variant
have permitted the UA W to negotiate pre-recruitment interim agreements with the Japanese-Big Three and Saturn which have provided
for labor-management cooperation on a wide range of strategic and
shop floor matters. 230 The NLRA paradigm has even allowed the
Japanese transplants to screen out employees with pro-union sympathies and to create a non-union workplace to discourage labor
organizing. 231
These labor relations developments have occurred, in part, because the NLRA is a limited labor-management relations paradigm
which contemplates that labor and management will define the paradigm's private law dimension in their collective agreements. Operating inside the NLRA's public law framework, the parties first

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text.
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established the Fordist adversarial labor relations system defined in
terms of the 1948 GM-UAW model and then in the 1980's created
three labor relations pre-paradigms which may suggest the existence
of a post-Fordist order. 232 At the same time, the Japanese transplants,
operating outside the paradigm's limited regulatory scope, have institutionalized a non-union lean production labor relations model.
If Turner is correct and cooperative labor-management relations is the wave of the future, then organized labor needs to play
an active role in a post-Fordist world by strengthening its hand in
truly cooperative actions from the strategic level to the shop floor
and by organizing the non-union transplants. Yet the redefinition of
the NLRA paradigm by collective bargaining agreements at Saturn
and the joint ventures and the practice of lean production labor
relations at the Asian transplants do not bode well for the UA W,
CAW, and North American autoworkers' prospects. Advancing transplant labor organizing activities and promoting real labor-management
cooperation will require alteration of the NLRA paradigm's public
law dimension.
The UAW and CAW both have an ongoing interest in labor law
reform. However, the need is clearly more urgent in the United States,
because Canadian labor law is more supportive of organized labor.
The Clinton administration has recognized this need by putting labor
law reform back on the political agenda with Secretary of Labor
Robert Reich's appointment of a Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations chaired by John T. Dunlop. 233 One fundamental question the Dunlop Commission will need to address is: can
the NLRA be altered to provide organized labor with the opportunity
to play an active role in labor management relations that protects
and advances its interests? In answering this question, the commission
will need to distinguish between those changes which can be accomplished by judicial action and those which will require a legislative
solution.

Judicial Solution
The National Labor Relations Act has been defined by NLRB
and federal court of appeals decisions, but these administrative and
judicial actions do not provide an encouraging avenue for labor law

232. See supra notes 57-61, 216-25 and accompanying text.
233. Lindley H. Clark, Yet Another Clinton Commission-on Unions, WALL ST. 1., Apr.
6, 1993, at A14; Mike McNamee eta!., Reich's Return to Those Thrilling Days of Yesteryear,
Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1993, at 45.
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reform. 234 NLRB and federal court decisions have increasingly made
it more difficult for auto workers and the UAW to exercise their
NLRA rights to organize, bargain with management, and to take
concerted action. To rectify this situation, there are at least two
judicial actions which would advance the ability of labor to organize
the transplants and bargain with management over an overtly cooperative labor contract.
The Supreme Court needs to reaffirm its commitment to its Cabot
Carbon 235 decision by overturning the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Court
of Appeals decisions which "have departed from a strict reading of
Section 8(a)(2) on such avowed policy grounds as rejection of a 'purely
adversarial model of labor relations' and acceptance of a 'cooperative
arrangement' .... " 236 The NLRB's recent decision in the Electromotion case may provide the Court with the opportunity to make a
definitive statement about the use of lean production teams in a nonunion setting. 237 A Supreme Court decision which found that the
Japanese transplants' teams violated the NLRA Section 8(a)(2), because they impinged upon their employees' Section 7 rights would
clearly strike a heavy blow at the non-union Japanese labor relations
model (Model III) and in favor of union organizing and a preparadigm collective contract outlined above, because it would overturn
the decisions of the courts of appeal in which all the transplants are
located.
The Supreme Court also needs to overturn its decision in the
Borg- War~er238 case and eliminate its "rigid and unrealistic dichotomy" between mandatory and permissive collective bargaining subjects.239 Since the Wagner Act did not explicitly make this distinction,
overturning Borg- Warner and eliminating this judicially-imposed distinction would expand the NLRA's scope beyond its judicially-narrowed shop floor focus and grant labor an independent legal basis
for strategic level participation. Since the Saturn Labor Agreement
involves mandatory provisions, eliminating the mandatory-permissive
dichotomy will threaten management's "entrepreneurial sover-

234. See NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984); Hertzga &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); Federal Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915
(6th Cir. 1968); Chicago Rawhide Mfgr. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
235. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
236. St. Antoine, supra note 120, at 52.
237. NLRB v. Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990 (1992); NLRB Cites Electromation for
Illegal Domination, D.L.R. (BNA) No. 244, at A-A (Dec. 23, 1992); Stephen I. Schlossberg &
Miriam Birgit Reinhart, Electromation and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation in
tfle U.S., 43 LAB. L.J. 608 (1992) (arguing that the cooperative German model is the appropriate
model under the Electromation decision).
238. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
239. St. Antoine, supra note 120, at 52.
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eignty,' ' 240 but it will insure that management will not be able to have
it both ways: speaking the language of cooperative labor-management
relations but practicing the politics of managerial control. Overturning
Borg- Warner will provide the opportunity to make cooperative codetermined labor-management relations a reality.
If the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to Cabot Carbon and overturned the Borg- Warner decision, thereby judicially
expanded labor's right to organize and extended its right to bargain
over strategic level subjects, the court would clearly advance employees' Section 7 rights to cooperative co-determined labor-management
relations. 241 Yet these judicial changes are only half of the equation.
The other half which has the capacity to provide a comprehensive
answer is labor law reform. Without labor law reform, organized
labor has much to fear from labor-management cooperation and from
the advocates of cooperation on the shop floor and adversarialism at
the bargaining table. The Supreme Court's decision in the Yeshiva
case suggests that adversarial bargaining may be a moot point if a
federal appellate court would decide that auto workers are managers
when they cooperate in deciding matters that have traditionally involved strategic level subjects. 242 So the UA W may be well advised
not to abandon its adversarial tradition and cooperate in managerial
decision-making until Congress seriously grapples with and resolves
fundamental legal issues which have been brought into focus by the
conflict between labor law paradigms.
Legislative Solutions

Labor law reform last attracted national political attention in
1978 when Congress failed to pass the Carter administration's labor
legislation. 243 Now the Clinton administration has put labor law issues
back on the political agenda with the establishment of the Dunlop
Commission which will scrutinize the National Labor Relations Act
and the Fordist model of adversarial labor management relations in
making its proposals for labor law reform. 244 This time the reform
proposals and the debate that they will generate are likely to focus
on both union and non-union plant issues and be defined in terms of
the contending labor law paradigms. NLRA Fordist and Japanese
lean production labor relations paradigms will provide the backdrop

240. /d. at 51.
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
242. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 686-90 (1980).
243. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 41, at 143-45; KocHAN, supra note 56, at 44.
244. Richard Rothstein, New Bargain or No Bargain, THE AM. PROSPECT Summer, 1993,
at 32.
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and set the parameters for debate over non-union plant issues which
will be driven primarily by the NLRA's Canadian variant and focus
on labor organizing and unfair labor practice questions. On the other
hand, union plant issues will be guided by the German co-determination paradigm and focus on collective bargaining and grievance
settlement issues. 245
In crafting legislation, the Reich Commission and later the Clinton administration will have a wide range of proposals to consider. 246
Scrapping the NLRA and leaving labor legislation to the states will
not receive any serious consideration. Section 14(b)'s demise might
eliminate a safe haven for non-union transplants, but only Nissan is
located in a Right to Work state and the Japanese automakers success
in resisting the UA W's organizing effort has been attributed to Tennessee's anti-union culture. 247 Incremental changes in the structure of
the NLRA paradigm are more likely to be included in the administrations's proposals. One frequently touted proposal drawn from the
Canadian experience-shorter union certification campaigns and the
use of union authorization cards-should be accepted hesitantly. The
UAW and CAW's experience with the Asian transplants suggests that
this reform may be helpful, but it should be remembered that CAMI
was organized by a pre-hire agreement similar to those at Mazda,
NUMMI, and Saturn, and that the CAW, even though it can rely on
the union authorization cards, has not succeeded in organizing Honda,
Toyota, and Hyundai.
Is it possible to move beyond these incremental reform proposals
towards a reconceptualization of the NLRA paradigm? The Clinton
administration is said to be enamored of the German co-determination
model (Model 111). 248 If this is true, the administration will be attracted
to Barry and Irving Bluestone's Negotiating the Future 249 in which
they propose to move beyond Fordist collective bargaining's narrow
shop floor level to a German co-determination-inspired ''Enterprise
Compact" most closely embodied in the Saturn labor agreement and
its Consensus Guidelines. 25° Consistent with Pre-paradigm Ill, their
245. Samuel Estreicher, Employee Voice in Competitive Markets, THE AM. PROSPECT,
Summer, 1993, at 48, 51-52.
246. Alexander Cockburn, Clinton and Labor: Reform Equals Rollback; Beat the Devil,
THE NATION; May 17, 1993, at 654; Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, A New Deal for
Labor, N.Y. TIMEs, March 10, 1993, at A7; Rothstein, supra note 244.
247. Mair, supra note 93, at 366.
248. The Same Old Song, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1993, at A14.
249. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5.
250. See Roy J. Adams, Efficiency is Not Enough, 17 LAB. ST. J. 18 (1992); J. Bavitz
Bonanno, Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe,
and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. ON LEG. 947 (1977).
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Enterprise Compact would eliminate management's exclusive right to
direct the firm and "herald joint labor-management action on all
decisions of the firm, both workplace and strategic." 251 To create this
new labor-management relations paradigm, the Bluestones do not
believe it will be "absolutely necessary" to amend the NLRA, but
they argue that "rewriting it ... to give participatory management a
government imprimatur would have the salutary effect of encouraging
management and labor to consider adopting the spirit, and perhaps
the provisions of the Enterprise Company. 252
The Enterprise Compact is a provocative proposal, but it is
faulted, because it fails to appreciate the critical support a legal
infrastructure provides for paradigm change. In spite of the Bluestones' belief, rewriting the NLRA is unlikely to happen, because
labor-management jointness is only possible where there is a cohesive
labor movement backed by corporatist bargaining and supported by
a political party and labor laws which provide the basis for independent labor participation in industrial decision making. In the
United States,. however, the labor movement is divided over the virtues
of adversarialism and cooperation, corporatist bargaining and political
party support is weak, and the National Labor Relations Act does
not provide the legal foundation for organized labor's independent
participation.
In sum, the Clinton administration's legislative package is likely
to include Canadian-inspired non-union plant proposals which will
hopefully restore to the NRLA paradigm a more labor-oriented focus.
The administration's package may also use some co-determination
language, but it is unlikely to include proposals which would reaffirm
Cabot Carbon, overrule Borg-Warner, and support labor-management
co-determination. The character of the United States Model IV labormanagement relations system will shape the president's proposals and
the prospects for reform. Those prospects are dim if one accepts
Lowell Turner's contention about the· United States labor relations
system: that corporatist bargaining structures are weak, organized
labor's peak association is fragmented, and, organized labor enjoys
only marginally increased support from the public, the Democratic
Party, and the Clinton administration. 253 Succinctly stated, business
opposition is too great, union power is too weak, "the United States
... is not Germany." 254 As a consequence, Congress is likely to see
only minimal legal changes which the Clinton administration will
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claim establish a more level playing field for labor and management,
but which will, in fact, allow business to be more competitive in a
global marketplace than to meaningfully advance the interests of
labor.

